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OVERVIEW — Medicare spending on post-acute care provided 
by home health agencies, skilled nursing facilities, inpatient 
rehabilitation facilities, and long-term care hospitals accounted for 
about 10 percent of total program outlays in 2013. The Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission and others have noted several 
long-standing problems with the payment systems for post-acute 
care and have suggested refinements to Medicare’s post-acute care 
payment systems that are intended to encourage the delivery of 
appropriate care in the right setting for a patient’s condition. The 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 contained 
several provisions that affect the Medicare program’s post-acute 
care payment systems, as well as broader payment reforms such 
as bundled payment models. Subsequent legislation, including the 
Pathway for SGR Reform Act of 2013, the Protecting Access to 
Medicare Act of 2014, and the Improving Medicare Post-Acute 
Care Transformation Act of 2014, all contain provisions that will 
affect future payments to one or more post-acute care providers. 
This issue brief describes Medicare’s payment systems for 
post-acute care providers, evidence of problems that have been 
identified with the payment systems, and policies that have been 
proposed or enacted to remedy those problems.
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The traditional or fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare program pays for skilled care, therapy, and other services provided 
by home health agencies (HHAs), skilled nursing facilities 
(SNFs), inpatient rehabilitation facilities (IRFs), and long-term 
care hospitals (LTCHs), collectively known as post-acute care 
(PAC) providers because they typically furnish care after an 
inpatient hospital stay. In 2013, FFS Medicare spent $59 billion, 
about 10 percent of total program outlays, on post-acute care and 
more than double what the program spent in 2001.1 Although 
the rate of spending growth for fee-for-service post-acute care 
grew more rapidly than other services between 2005 and 2010, 
spending growth has slowed or even declined for some sectors 
in recent years. This is due in part to the expanded enrollment 
of Medicare beneficiaries in Medicare Advantage plans,2 and 
in part to a drop in the number of three-day inpatient hospital 
stays that would trigger eligibility for post-acute care in a skilled 
nursing facility.3 The decline in spending for post-acute care 
is also consistent with a general slowdown in both public and 
private sector spending on health care.4 
Medicare uses a prospective payment system for each type of post-
acute provider. These systems, implemented between 1998 and 2002, set 
rates on the basis of historical national average costs for each provider 
type. Several problems have plagued these systems, including excessive 
payments, imprecise adjustment for differences in patient needs 
(known as case mix adjustment), inadequate quality measurement, and 
insufficient appropriateness criteria. Multiple changes have been made to 
the post-acute care payment systems in law and in regulation since they 
were implemented. For example, the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 2010 (ACA) included reductions5 in annual updates for 
inflation, requirements to reduce the HHA payments to better reflect 
average costs, a requirement for the Secretary of the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) to develop a value-based purchasing 
plan for SNFs and HHAs, and penalties for LTCHs and IRFs that do not 
report quality data to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
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(CMS) starting in 2014. More recently, the Pathway for SGR Reform Act 
of 2013 phases in a policy that restricts LTCH-level payments to those 
patients who meet certain requirements related to the type and duration 
of their acute and post-acute care. For all other patients, the Act calls for 
Medicare to make payments that are based on the payment an acute care 
hospital would receive for the same patient.6 
POST-ACUTE CARE IN MEDICARE
Broadly defined, post-acute care is skilled nursing care and therapy 
provided after an inpatient hospitalization. In some cases, it may shorten 
the hospital stay for patients who need ongoing care.7 
Providers
The four post-acute providers discussed above—home health agencies, 
skilled nursing facilities, inpatient rehabilitation facilities, and long-term 
care hospitals—provide care to those patients who continue to need 
institutional care or otherwise may have difficulty accessing ambulatory 
care, but they are not the sole providers of post-hospital care. And not all 
Medicare beneficiaries are admitted to these settings after an inpatient 
stay. Patients may be admitted directly to an IRF or LTCH without a 
preceding hospital stay. A growing share of home health episodes are not 
preceded by an inpatient stay. In 2012, 66 percent of home health episodes 
were not preceded by an inpatient stay, up from 52 percent in 2001.8 
There were more than 29,000 post-acute care providers in the United 
States in 2014: 12,461 HHAs; 15,173 SNFs; 1,177 IRFs; and 422 LTCHs.9 The 
numbers of institutional PAC providers have been relatively stable.10 
In contrast, the number of HHAs increased substantially with the 
introduction of the home health prospective payment system in 2000. 
Between 2000 and 2013, the number of HHAs grew by 68 percent.11 
Concerns about aberrant patterns of utilization associated with potential 
fraud and abuse prompted the Secretary of HHS to exercise her authority 
under the ACA to impose a temporary moratorium on the enrollment of 
new agencies in parts of Florida, Illinois, Michigan, and Texas.12 Between 
2013 and 2014, the number of HHAs decreased by 1.2 percent, with 
declines concentrated in Texas and Florida.13
PAC providers are not evenly distributed across the country. Population 
concentration and state certificate of need laws affect the number and 
location of post-acute care providers. Skilled nursing facilities and home 
A growing share of  
home health episodes 
are not preceded by an 
inpatient stay. 
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health agencies are widely available in every state. There is at least one 
IRF in each state and the District of Columbia, but they are concentrated 
in populous areas with high concentrations of Medicare beneficiaries.14 
Some states have several LTCHs, whereas others have none. In places 
without IRFs and LTCHs, patients may be treated in other PAC settings or 
in acute care hospitals.
PAC providers must meet certain conditions to be eligible to receive 
Medicare payment. IRFs must meet Medicare conditions of participation15 
for acute care hospitals and facility-level criteria that are designed to 
provide some assurance that the IRF setting is appropriate for admitted 
patients. Sixty percent of cases in a Medicare-certified IRF must have 
1 of 13 diagnoses specified by Medicare; this requirement is known as 
the 60 percent rule.16 Long-term care hospitals must also meet the same 
conditions of participation as acute care hospitals, and their Medicare 
patients must have an average length of stay greater than 25 days.17 As 
noted, the Pathway for SGR Reform Act imposes additional restrictions, 
discussed in greater detail below, on payments to LTCHs based on 
beneficiaries’ prior use of inpatient intensive care services and diagnosis 
at discharge from the LTCH. 
Patients 
Home health care is the most commonly used PAC provider, with 3.5 
million Medicare users, followed by SNFs with 1.7 million users in 2013.18 
Relatively few beneficiaries receive care in IRFs or LTCHs each year due 
to the specialized nature of the care they provide, program criteria, and 
their lack of availability in certain geographic areas. In 2013, 338,000 
beneficiaries received care in an IRF and just 122,000 received care in 
an LTCH.19 Patients may use more than one type of post-acute care in 
an episode. For example, a person may be discharged from a SNF and 
receive home health care upon returning home. In a more unusual 
circumstance, a patient might be discharged from a SNF to an IRF when 
he or she has regained strength and is able to tolerate the more intensive 
therapy provided in an IRF setting.
Medicare requires that beneficiaries meet certain criteria to be eligible 
for services provided in some post-acute care settings (TABLE 1, next page). 
Up to 100 days of SNF care are covered per spell of illness,20 provided 
the beneficiary needs daily skilled nursing or therapy.21 The program 
requires at least a three-day inpatient hospital stay in the 30 days prior to 
a SNF admission. For Medicare to cover care provided in an IRF, patients 
PAC providers are not 
evenly distributed across 
the country.
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TABLE 1 
Facility and Patient Criteria and Common Conditions by Post-Acute Care Setting
Skilled Nursing Facility Home Health Agency
Inpatient  
Rehabilitation Facility
Long-Term Care  
Hospital
Facility criteria n/a n/a At least 60 percent 
of the facility’s 
patients have one 
of several specific 
medical conditions 
that require inpatient 
therapy. 
Average Medicare 
length of stay greater 
than 25 days.
Patient criteria Patient needs skilled 
nursing services or 
skilled rehabilitation 
services for the short 
term on a daily basis 
in an inpatient setting 
after an inpatient stay 
of 3 or more days.
Patient needs fewer 
than 8 hours per day 
of intermittent skilled 
care.
Must be unable to 
leave home without 
considerable effort.
Patient needs 
intensive 
rehabilitation 
therapy in an 
inpatient hospital 
environment. Patient 
requires and is 
expected to benefit 
from 3 hours or more 
of therapy at least 5 
days per week.
n/a
Commonly treated 
diagnoses or 
conditions
• Joint replacement
• Kidney and  
urinary tract  
infections 
• Hip and femur 
procedures 
• Heart failure and 
shock
• Pneumonia
• Diabetes
• Hypertension
• Heart failure
• Skin ulcer
• Osteoarthrosis
• Stroke
• Lower extremity 
fracture
• Neurological 
disorders
• Debility
• Major joint  
replacement
• Brain injury
• Respiratory 
diagnosis with 
prolonged 
mechanical 
ventilation
• Pulmonary edema 
and respiratory 
failure
• Severe septicemia 
or sepsis 
• Respiratory  
infections and 
inflammations
• Skin ulcers with 
complications/ 
comorbidities
Sources: Facility and patient criteria are from Laura Dummit, “Medicare’s Bundling Pilot: Including Post-Acute Care Services,” National Health Policy 
Forum, Issue Brief No. 841, March 29, 2011, p. 6, www.nhpf.org/library/details.cfm/2850. Commonly treated diagnoses or conditions are from: Centers 
for Medicare & Medicare Services (CMS), Office of Enterprise Data and Analytics (OEDA), Medicare and Medicaid Statistical Supplement, 2013 edition, 
table 7.6 (HHA), “Persons Using Medicare Home Health Agency Services, Visits, Total Charges, Visit Charges, and Program Payments, by Principal 
Diagnosis Within Major Diagnostic Classifications (MDCs): Calendar Year 2012,” www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-
and-Reports/MedicareMedicaidStatSupp/Downloads/2013_Section7.pdf#Table7.6; Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), Report to the 
Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, March 2015, p. 185 (SNF), www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/mar2015_entirereport_revised.pdf; MedPAC, 
A Data Book: Health Care Spending and the Medicare Program, June 2015, p. 125 (IRF), p. 128 (LTCH), www.medpac.gov/documents/data-book/
june-2015-databook-health-care-spending-and-the-medicare-program.pdf.
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must need and be expected to benefit from intensive rehabilitation 
therapy in a hospital environment.22 Patients receiving Medicare-
covered home health care generally must be confined to the home 
and in need of skilled nursing care on an intermittent basis or have a 
continuing need for physical therapy, occupational therapy, or speech-
language pathology services.23 
Although the Medicare program has different coverage criteria and 
facility requirements for each PAC setting, there is considerable overlap 
in services and expertise across providers. For example, a patient may 
receive post-acute care after a hip fracture from an HHA, SNF, or IRF. As 
described in the next section, the Medicare program and beneficiaries 
face different costs depending on the post-acute care setting in which a 
patient is treated. The significant differences in payment amounts in the 
absence of clear evidence regarding appropriateness of care or outcomes 
have been a concern for policymakers.24
Payment Systems 
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 (P.L. 105-33) mandated prospective 
payment systems (PPSs) for home health agencies, skilled nursing 
facilities, and inpatient rehabilitation facilities. The prospective payment 
system for long-term care hospitals was mandated in the Balanced 
Budget Refinement Act of 1999 (P.L. 106-113) and the Medicare and 
Medicaid Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 (P.L. 106-554). 
Before prospective payment systems were implemented for post-acute 
care providers, each provider was paid its average costs, subject to limits, 
for treating Medicare beneficiaries. Enabling legislation and subsequent 
rule-making specified the features of the prospective payment systems, 
including the unit of service (for example, a discharge, an episode, or a 
day of care), the base payment rates (the price Medicare pays for a unit 
of service), and the case mix adjustment systems, which raise or lower 
the base payment amount depending on the resources required to treat 
patients with certain characteristics. The phase-in of the prospective 
rates and phase-out of reasonable cost-based payments began for SNFs 
in 1998, for HHAs in 2000, for IRFs in January 2002, and for LTCHs in 
October 2002.25 
Under each PPS, Medicare pays providers a fee that is based on estimates 
of the national average cost of providing covered care for a specified 
period of time (TABLE 2, next page). In three of the settings, the program 
pays for an episode of care; payment for home health care is made in 
Although the Medicare 
program has different 
coverage criteria and 
facility requirements for 
each PAC setting, there 
is considerable overlap 
in services and expertise 
across providers.
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increments of 60-day episodes, whereas inpatient rehabilitation facilities 
and long-term care hospitals are paid per discharge, like acute care 
hospitals. For care in a skilled nursing facility, the Medicare program 
pays a daily rate that is inclusive of almost all services provided.26 
Program payments for each patient are determined by adjusting the 
base rates for expected resource needs of the patient (see below) and 
geographic variation in wages. Each of the payment systems, except for 
the SNF payment system, also has outlier policies that adjust payments 
for exceptionally high- or low-cost cases.27
Beneficiaries are responsible for different cost-sharing amounts 
depending on the setting in which care is provided. Those receiving 
care in a SNF do not pay any cost sharing for the first 20 days. For days 
21 to 100, beneficiaries pay a daily copayment equaling one-eighth of 
the hospital deductible ($157.50 in 2015).28 Beneficiaries who transfer to 
an IRF or LTCH within 60 days of being discharged from an acute care 
hospital pay no additional deductible beyond that paid during the acute 
care hospital stay. Beneficiaries admitted to an IRF or LTCH from the 
community are responsible for a deductible ($1,260 in 2015) at the first 
admission during a spell of illness, and for a daily copayment ($315 per 
day in 2015) for days 61 through 90.29 Home health care is the only post-
acute care service that does not require beneficiary cost sharing. MedPAC 
has recommended numerous times that the program add a requirement 
for beneficiary copayments for home health episodes that are not 
preceded by a hospitalization or other use of post-acute care. President 
Obama’s 2016 budget proposed a copayment of $100 for home health 
episodes with five or more visits not preceded by a hospital or other 
inpatient post-acute care stay beginning in 2019.30
TABLE 2: Unit of Payment, Average Payment Amount, and  
Length of Stay in Post-Acute Care Settings, 2013
Skilled 
Nursing Facility
Home Health  
Agency
Inpatient  
Rehabilitation Facility
Long-Term  
Care Hospital
Unit of Payment Day 60-day episode Discharge Discharge
Average payment 
per unit
$11,357 
per stay
$2,720  
per episode
$18,258  
per discharge
$40,070  
per discharge
Average  
length of stay
27.6 days 1.9 episodes 12.9 days 26.5 days
Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, March 2015, p. 185, 188 (SNF), 
p. 221 (HHA), p. 244 (IRF), p. 268 (LTCH), www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/mar2015_entirereport_revised.pdf.
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Spending 
Medicare fee-for-service spending for post-acute care totaled $59 billion 
in 2013 or about 10 percent of total program expenditures of $583 billion.31 
SNF payments of $28.8 billion accounted for nearly half of PAC dollars 
and 5 percent of total Medicare spending.32 In that same year, home health 
care spending was $17.9 billion or about 3 percent of Medicare spending.33 
At $6.8 billion for IRFs and $5.5 billion for LTCHs, spending in these two 
sectors combined accounted for 2 percent of total program outlays.34 
Between 2003 and 2013, spending on post-acute care increased 74 percent 
(FIGURE 1).35 Spending doubled for LTCHs and SNFs and increased by 77 
percent and 10 percent, respectively, for HHAs and IRFs.36 A variety of 
factors account for increased spending on PAC services. Home health 
spending growth has been driven by an increase in the number of 
agencies, the number of users, and the number of episodes per user, as 
well as a shift in the mix of services used away from home health aide 
visits toward more costly skilled nursing and therapy visits.37 Spending 
on SNF services has not been driven by more users or more days of care, 
but mostly by an increase in the intensity of services, primarily therapy.38 
FIGURE 1
Medicare Spending on Post-Acute Care, 2003 to 2013
Source: Mark E. Miller, Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, “Medicare Post-Acute Care Reforms,” statement before the Subcommittee on Health, 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, April 16, 2015, p. 2, http://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF14/20150416/103327/
HHRG-114-IF14-Wstate-MillerM-20150416.pdf.
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POST-ACUTE CARE POLICY AND PAYMENT SYSTEMS: 
PROBLEMS AND REMEDIES
MedPAC, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), and others 
have identified several problematic features of Medicare post-acute care 
policies and payment systems and their effect on care delivery, including:
•  difficulty determining the appropriate post-acute care setting;
•  payments considerably in excess of provider costs; 
•  case mix measures that do not accurately adjust payments for 
differences in the costs of treating different categories of patients; 
retrospective adjustments that incent greater use of therapy services; 
and threshold policies that encourage timing of discharges to 
maximize reimbursements; and
•  uniform payment for care regardless of appropriateness or quality. 
Recommended payment changes to address these problems include: 
recalculating the base payment rates (also known as rebasing) to ensure 
that payments are more in line with providers’ costs); gainsharing (a 
process for sharing a portion of savings generated from efficiencies with 
providers) to encourage providers to be more efficient; modifying case mix 
measures to more accurately reflect the costs of treating different types of 
patients; moving toward a unified payment system for PAC services that 
would be based on patient characteristics rather than the site of care; and 
bundling payments. Some of these changes to the prospective payment 
systems to improve payment accuracy and care delivery have been made 
in law or in regulation, whereas others have not been adopted. This 
section discusses some of the problems with the post-acute care PPSs and 
the major recommendations to address these problems.
Dif ficulty Determining Appropriate Set ting
Despite Medicare’s attempt to define criteria for appropriate use of 
different PAC provider types, there are no definitive guidelines on 
determining which patients need or would benefit from PAC services.39 
Furthermore, distinctions between settings are unclear and evidence 
is lacking regarding which settings are best for treating which types of 
conditions. Not surprisingly, patients with similar needs are treated in 
different settings. As a result, there is wide geographic variation in both 
utilization and spending for PAC services. Comparing the highest-use to 
the lowest-use areas of the country, MedPAC found that post-acute care 
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spending varied eight-fold; spending for inpatient hospitals, in contrast, 
varied only 60 percent. Spending also varied three-fold for conditions 
that typically use PAC services.40 These data suggest that patients in some 
areas may be treated in higher-intensity and more expensive settings than 
they need, and other patients may receive unneeded PAC services. 
Researchers have examined characteristics of patients treated in different 
settings and looked at whether their outcomes are different. Through 
comparisons of patient risk profiles, market conditions where facilities 
were located, and patient outcomes, MedPAC has shown that LTCH 
patients cannot be clearly distinguished from chronically critically ill 
(CCI) patients receiving care in acute care hospitals and some SNFs.41 
Although care for CCI patients in LTCHs is more expensive, studies have 
“failed to find a clear advantage in outcomes for LTCH users.”42 In areas 
without LTCHs, CCI patients are treated in SNFs or IRFs, or with longer 
stays in acute care hospitals, which suggests that medically complex 
patients can be treated appropriately in other settings. The treatment of 
certain CCI patients in LTCHs may also introduce distortions to the acute 
care hospital PPS, potentially causing payment rates that are too low for 
complex patients treated in acute care hospitals in areas where LTCHs 
aren’t available.43 
In an attempt to differentiate LTCH patients from those who could be 
treated in acute care hospitals, Congress included a provision in the 
Pathway for SGR Reform Act of 2013 restricting LTCH-level payments. 
Beginning in October 2015, LTCH-level payments will be made only for 
patients whose transfer to the LTCH was preceded by at least a three-day 
stay in an acute care hospital intensive care unit (ICU), or whose diagnosis 
at discharge from the LTCH indicates that they received mechanical 
ventilation services for at least 96 hours. Patients not meeting the three-
day ICU stay or ventilation threshold will be paid at a rate comparable 
to that paid to an acute care hospital. 44 This threshold is considerably 
less than an eight-day stay threshold recommended by MedPAC in 2014 
and 2015.45 To address the issue of underpayment for some CCI patients 
in acute care hospitals, MedPAC has also proposed allocating funds that 
would have gone to LTCHs to the hospital PPS outlier pool.46 
MedPAC has also examined the potential overlap of patients in SNFs 
and IRFs and concluded that, for 22 conditions frequently treated 
in both settings, there is little difference in patient characteristics or 
outcomes.47 On the basis of these findings, MedPAC has recommended 
that for selected conditions, “the IRF base payment rate be set equal to 
the average SNF payment per discharge for each condition.”48 Other 
In areas without LTCHs, 
chronically critically ill 
patients are treated in 
SNFs or IRFs, or with 
longer stays in acute care 
hospitals, which suggests 
that medically complex 
patients can be treated 
appropriately in other 
settings.
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IRF payments would not be affected, and IRFs would not be required to 
comply with current regulations dealing with intensity and service mix 
for these conditions. President Obama’s 2016 budget for HHS included 
a proposal to equalize payment for some conditions commonly treated 
in IRFs and SNFs. A second proposal in the budget would adjust the 
standard for classifying a facility as an IRF by requiring that 75 percent 
of cases admitted to an IRF, rather than 60 percent, have at least 1 of the 
13 conditions as currently required. This change would encourage IRFs to 
avoid admitting low-acuity patients who may receive appropriate care in 
other, lower-cost settings.49
Another avenue of post-acute care payment reform, sometimes referred 
to as site-neutral payment, would integrate individual PPSs and pay 
for care on the basis of patient rather than facility characteristics.50 To 
understand costs and outcomes across different post-acute care sites and 
the feasibility of integrated post-acute care payment systems, Congress 
directed the Secretary of HHS to establish a demonstration program 
under section 5008 of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA, P.L. 109-171) 
by January 2008.51 The Post-Acute Care Payment Reform Demonstration 
(PAC-PRD) was conducted over three years, and findings were released 
in a report to the Congress in January 2012.52 It used a standardized 
patient assessment instrument, called the Continuity Assessment Record 
and Evaluation (CARE) tool, to collect data at discharge from acute care 
hospitals and at admission and discharge from post-acute care sites. 
The demonstration analyzed factors that can help predict costs53 in each of 
the different post-acute care sites, but developing an entirely new payment 
system was beyond the scope of the project. The demonstration focused 
on “creating a solid basis from which a payment system could potentially 
be built in the future and [providing] information on the extent it seemed 
advisable to proceed with development of a system that could cover 
more than one PAC setting.”54 Among the demonstration’s key findings 
were that “evidence supports the potential for development of a common 
payment system for the three inpatient post-acute care settings: LTCHs, 
IRFs, and SNFs,” but that “a payment model combining home health with 
the other types of PAC providers is not supported by the analysis.”55 
Building on the PAC-PRD, the Improving Medicare Post-Acute Care 
Transformation (IMPACT) Act of 2014 requires post-acute care providers 
to begin collecting uniform assessment data in 2018. After two years 
of data collection, the Secretary is required to recommend a uniform 
payment system for post-acute care. The IMPACT Act also charges 
MedPAC with developing a prototype prospective payment system 
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encompassing all PAC settings using the data previously collected under 
the PAC-PRD. MedPAC’s report is due in 2016.56 
While these proposals create incentives to place patients in appropriate 
lower-cost settings, they do not address the question of whether someone 
should be receiving PAC services at all. An episode payment that 
bundles payments for a hospitalization and any necessary PAC would 
create incentives for the provider receiving the payment to deliver only 
necessary PAC services in the lowest cost settings. MedPAC recommended 
testing bundled payment of PAC services in 2008 and has examined a 
variety of bundled payment designs in the ensuing years.57 The ACA 
mandated that HHS test bundled PAC payments, and the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) is mounting a demonstration 
of different models of bundling known as the Bundled Payment for 
Care Improvement (BPCI) initiative.58 Rather than a single payment to 
one provider, BPCI involves usual payments to all providers serving a 
beneficiary and one provider able to earn shared savings if the total can be 
reduced below a targeted level. A similar approach is used in the hospital 
value-based purchasing proposal, where hospitals have an incentive to 
lower spending in the 30 days following discharge. Bundled payments 
do create a clear incentive for coordinating care and lowering episode 
costs, but those lower costs may result from greater efficiency through 
delivering only necessary, lowest-cost services or by stinting on needed 
services. Bundled payments will need to be accompanied by sufficient 
oversight and accountability to ensure patients’ needs are being met.59
Payments Well  in Excess of Providers’  Costs 
Medicare net revenue or profit margins, calculated using data from 
providers’ cost reports, are a measure of program spending relative 
to the costs of treating beneficiaries. Average Medicare margins of 
post-acute care providers are high and have been for many years, 
particularly in HHAs and SNFs (FIGURE 2, next page). High margins, along 
with other indicators of Medicare payment adequacy, had led MedPAC 
to recommend for several years that the Congress eliminate the annual 
inflation updates for SNFs, HHAs, IRFs, and LTCHs. The ACA included 
provisions to reduce the market basket updates for all post-acute care 
providers. They involved (i) productivity adjustments to the annual 
inflation updates in all four PAC settings, and (ii) a fixed percentage point 
reduction to the inflation updates for HHAs, IRFs, and LTCHs for multiple 
years. With the exception of IRFs, all PAC providers saw declines in their 
Bundled payments will 
need to be accompanied 
by sufficient oversight 
and accountability to 
ensure patients’ needs are 
being met.
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2013 Medicare margins as a result of such payment changes. Nevertheless, 
because indicators continue to signal more-than-adequate Medicare 
payments, MedPAC recommended no market basket updates for 2016.60
MedPAC has also recommended that the home health and SNF payment 
systems be rebased to better align Medicare payments and providers’ 
costs. Generally, payment systems may need to be rebased when there is 
evidence that the nature or mix of the services provided have changed 
since the base rates were initially determined. Home health patients now 
receive fewer visits and a different mix of services than when the rates 
were established using cost data from 1997, contributing to significant 
overpayment.61 The growth in SNF margins was driven by a growing 
concentration of days in the highest paying case mix groups (discussed 
more below), where payments grew even more than providers’ costs.62
FIGURE 2: Medicare Margins by Post-Acute Care Sector, 2006 to 2013
Note: Margins for SNFs and HHAs are for freestanding facilities; margins for IRFs and LTCHs are for all facilities.
Sources: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, March 2015,  
www.medpac.gov/documents/reports/mar2015_entirereport_revised.pdf; and MedPAC, Report to the Congress: Impact of Home Health 
Payment Rebasing on Beneficiary Access to and Quality of Care, December 2014, p. 7, http://medpac.gov/documents/reports/december-
2014-report-to-the-congress-impact-of-home-health-payment-rebasing-on-beneficiary-access-to-and-quality-of-care.pdf.
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The ACA mandated that the home health PPS be rebased between 
2014 and 2017, but the effect of rebasing is partially offset by payment 
updates.63 Although the ACA requires a rebasing reduction of 3.5 percent, 
payment updates and growth in the size of the base rate will result in 
a net cumulative reduction in payments of only about 2 percent for an 
industry that has experienced annual double-digit margins for many 
years, according to MedPAC estimates.64 The ACA did not require 
rebasing the SNF PPS.65 
High average Medicare margins have raised some concerns, but so 
have the distributions of those margins. The high averages are the 
result of some HHAs and SNFs having margins well above the average, 
whereas others fall far below and may incur losses. In 2013, over one-
quarter of HHAs and SNFs had Medicare margins in excess of 21.5 
percent, 70 percent higher than the average. At the other extreme, the 
margins for providers in the lowest quartile were -3.4 percent or lower 
for freestanding HHAs and 3.7 percent or lower for freestanding SNFs.66 
These distributions raise questions about the underlying cause for the 
variation in financial performance, and whether it is due to differences in 
provider efficiency, patient populations, or the quality of care delivered—
aspects that are difficult to measure. 
The range of margins also raises concerns about rebasing as the 
mechanism to reduce average margins. Rebasing will likely be successful 
in changing that average, but it simply shifts the distribution. Some 
HHAs and some SNFs will earn margins well in excess of the average, 
indicating that Medicare pays too much. Some HHAs and some SNFs 
will incur larger losses. To the extent those losses reflect inadequate 
adjustment of Medicare payment rates to reflect the needs of patients 
being served, care for those patients may be jeopardized. Gainsharing 
has been suggested as an alternative to rebasing.67 It could reduce 
average margins as well as affect the distribution of margins because 
both higher profits and larger losses are shared between Medicare and 
providers. Incentives that come from prospective payment for providers 
to minimize costs would be reduced somewhat, but gainsharing provides 
some protection for patients while there is uncertainty about whether the 
prospective rates adequately reflect patients’ needs. 
Case Mix Adjustment
Prospective payments to PAC providers are adjusted for patient acuity and 
services provided, also called case mix. Case mix systems (i) categorize 
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patients into groups that are expected to have similar resource use based 
on patient characteristics and (ii) adjust base rates up or down to pay for 
the cost of care to each patient type. With accurate case mix adjustment, 
providers would be indifferent to the acuity and resource needs of the 
patient, which is important to ensuring access for all types of patients 
under a prospective payment system. If case mix systems fail to accurately 
categorize patients, or are based on characteristics that are subjective and 
can be manipulated by providers, certain patients become more or less 
profitable which could lead providers to prefer some types of patients and 
to over- or under-provide services. Inadequate case mix adjustment may 
also be a factor in the wide distribution of margins discussed above.
Medicare’s case mix systems for the four PAC settings adjust payments 
on the basis of some generally similar characteristics (TABLE 3), such 
as functional status (for example, the ability to walk or dress), clinical 
conditions, and amount of therapy. But the case mix systems are still 
distinct from each other and use different specific patient characteristics 
and metrics. Medicare requires SNFs, HHAs, and IRFs—but not LTCHs—
TABLE 3: Post-Acute Care Case Mix Systems, by Setting
Source: Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), Payment Basics for skilled nursing facility and home health agency services, October 
2014, http://medpac.gov/-documents-/payment-basics; MedPAC, Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, March 2014, p. 246 (IRF), 
http://medpac.gov/documents/reports/mar14_entirereport.pdf; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, LTC-DRG Files: in FY2015 MS-LTC-DRG 
File, “Table 11, MS-LTC-DRGS, Relative Weights, Geometric Average Length of Stay, Short-Stay Outlier (SSO) Threshold, and ‘IPPS Comparable 
Threshold’ for Discharges Occurring From October 1, 2014 through September 30, 2015 under the LTCH PPS,” www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-
Fee-for-Service-Payment/LongTermCareHospitalPPS/ltcdrg.html.
Skilled Nursing Facility Home Health Agency
Inpatient  
Rehabilitation Facility
Long-Term Care  
Hospital
Case mix system 
name
Resource Utilization 
Groups
Home Health  
Resource Groups
Case Mix Groups Medicare Severity 
Long-Term Care 
Diagnosis Related 
Groups
Number of case mix 
groups 66 153 92 753
Patient 
characteristics that 
determine case mix 
group
• Minutes of therapy 
per week
• Functional status  
• Clinical conditions
• Other services like 
respiratory therapy 
or specialized 
feeding 
• Number of therapy 
visits per episode
• Functional status
• Clinical conditions
• Reason for 
rehabilitation
• Age
• Cognitive and 
functional status
• Comorbidities
• Principal and 
secondary 
diagnoses
• Procedures
• Age
• Sex
• Discharge status
Patient assessment 
instrument
MDS OASIS IRF-PAI none
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to use a patient assessment instrument specific to each setting for 
assigning patients to case mix groups. The IMPACT Act of 2014, however, 
requires PAC providers to begin collecting uniform assessment data 
beginning in 2018. These data are intended to provide the foundation for 
the development of a uniform payment system for PAC services.68 They 
could, for example, be used to develop a common case mix system that 
could be used to align payments across PAC settings. 
Therapy Payment in Home Health and SNF Payment Systems 
Home health and SNF payments vary with the amount of therapy 
provided; they are not determined prospectively. MedPAC has found 
that the increased payments for patients in higher case mix groups 
(where patients get more therapy) more than cover the providers’ costs of 
providing that additional therapy.69 
Because payments are determined by the amount of therapy 
provided, and not by the expected need for therapy based on patients’ 
characteristics, this creates an incentive and an opportunity to furnish 
therapy that may exceed a patient’s needs in order to receive additional 
payments. Home health and skilled nursing facility providers have 
responded to these incentives by shifting patients to higher payment 
therapy case mix groups over time. For example, FIGURE 3 shows that SNF 
case mix has changed between 2006 and 2012, such that the percentage of 
FIGURE 3: Share of SNF Patient Days in Therapy, by Intensity of Case Mix Groups 
Source: Centers for Medicare 
& Medicaid Services (CMS), 
Office of Enterprise Data 
and Analytics (OEDA), 
Medicare and Medicaid 
Statistics Supplement, 
2007-2013 editions, table 6.9 
(2008-2013 editions) and 
table 6.9b (2007 edition), 
www.cms.gov/Research- 
Statistics-Data-and-Systems/
Statistics-Trends-and-
Reports/MedicareMedicaid-
StatSupp/index.html.0 20 40 60 80 100
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total patient days in therapy has grown overall, and the share of therapy 
days in the “ultra high” case mix groups has increased substantially. 
According to MedPAC, this shift to more intensive therapy days is not 
explained by changes in the health status of beneficiaries receiving 
care in SNFs.70 The Office of the Inspector General in HHS also found 
that therapy care provided to SNF patients was not related to patient 
characteristics.71 Since the implementation of the SNF payment system, 
CMS has revised the way it pays for therapy delivered in groups or 
delivered concurrently and added a requirement for patients to be 
reassessed (and for payment to be adjusted accordingly) when therapy is 
discontinued or when the amount of therapy increases or decreases. Even 
with these changes, the incentive to furnish therapy to achieve higher 
payments remains part of the SNF payment system.72
The changes in home health case mix also illustrate providers’ 
responsiveness to therapy payment policy. From 2001 to 2007, episodes 
with ten or more therapy visits received a higher payment than those 
with fewer than ten therapy visits.73 During this period the number 
of episodes with ten therapy visits grew.74 In 2008, CMS changed the 
therapy payment policy to lower payments for episodes with 10 to 13 
therapy visits and increase payments for episodes with 6 to 9 and 14 or 
more therapy visits.75 Subsequently, providers delivered fewer episodes 
with 10 to 13 therapy visits and more episodes with 6 to 9 and 14 or more 
therapy visits, resulting in the “largest one year shift in therapy volume 
since the PPS was implemented.”76 In 2011, CMS added a requirement for 
HHAs to review the need for therapy at points throughout the episode, 
and increased payments for non-therapy episodes and lowered payments 
for therapy episodes. Despite these changes, payments are still higher for 
therapy patients, and over 90 percent of the increase in episode volume 
since 2008 is attributable to episodes with six or more therapy visits.77 
MedPAC has recommended that Medicare discontinue using the amount 
of therapy as a factor in the home health and skilled nursing facility PPSs. 
It suggested that the payment systems instead use patient characteristics 
that predict therapy needs to set payment.78 
In addition to changes to the way therapy is factored into the case mix 
systems, MedPAC and others have recommended further refinements to 
case mix systems to improve the accuracy of Medicare’s PAC payments. 
For example, although SNF payments in aggregate more than cover 
providers’ costs, the SNF payment system does not accurately target 
payment for certain non-therapy ancillary services, such as expensive 
prescription drugs and parenteral feeding.79 GAO and MedPAC have 
The changes in home 
health case mix also 
illustrate providers’ 
responsiveness to therapy 
payment policy.
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recommended that the payment system be refined to address this, both to 
avoid access problems for patients needing such services and to prevent 
under-provision of these services in SNFs.80 CMS has made some changes 
to the SNF case mix system over time, but MedPAC has found these 
refinements inadequate to target payments properly for patients who 
need non-therapy ancillary services.
Shor t-Stay Discharge Thresholds for LTCHs
Changes in the timing of discharges after implementation of the 
prospective payment system for LTCHs in fiscal year (FY) 2002 also 
illustrate providers’ responsiveness to payment incentive changes. A 
“short-stay” outlier policy was included as part of the PPS under which 
LTCHs were paid substantially less—less than half, in some cases—for 
patients discharged before a DRG-specific length-of-stay threshold. A 
recent analysis81 of lengths of stay for patients with a respiratory system 
diagnosis needing prolonged mechanical ventilation found that, before 
implementation of the PPS, lengths of stay were evenly distributed 
before and after the short-stay threshold. After implementation of the 
short-stay threshold, however, very few live patients “were discharged 
before the short-stay threshold, and there was a significant increase in 
the percentage of discharges on or immediately after the threshold.”82 
Discharges of patients who died did not follow this pattern. MedPAC 
has discussed changes to LTCH payment policy that would reduce the 
payment cliff associated with failing to cross the short-stay threshold,83 
but the study’s authors remain skeptical of the efficacy of any policy that 
relies on length-of-stay thresholds to determine payment amounts. 
Quality Measurement and Payment
Medicare’s post-acute care PPSs do not currently pay on the basis of the 
quality of care provided. However, the ACA, the Protecting Access to 
Medicare Act of 2014 (PAMA), and the IMPACT Act all contain provisions 
that require one or more post-acute care providers to report on quality 
measures and impose financial penalties for not doing so. The ACA, for 
example, mandated CMS to require LTCHs and IRFs to report quality 
data by 2014 or face a 2 percent reduction in the applicable market basket 
update. Data collection for three LTCH quality measures began October 1, 
2012, and data collection for two additional measures related to influenza 
vaccinations for patients and staff began January 1, 2014. Payment updates 
in 2016 and beyond will be affected by reporting on these measures.84 In 
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2015, LTCHS will be required to report on two types of facility-acquired 
infections with consequences for payment updates beginning in FY 2017. 
Also beginning in FY 2017, CMS will begin calculating LTCHs’ all-cause 
unplanned readmission rates to acute care hospitals. Four more measures 
will be added in FY 2018, bringing the total number of LTCH quality 
measures to 12.85 In 2015 IRFs are required to report on two adverse 
events and additional quality measures related to influenza vaccinations 
for health care workers and patients.86 Depending on the measure, 
payment updates will be affected in FY 2016 or FY 2017. 
The 2014 IMPACT Act required a quality reporting program for SNFs. 
According to CMS, the program will use measures related to skin 
integrity, incidence of major falls, and functional and cognitive status. 
Reporting on these measures will begin in FY 2018.87 PAMA required the 
Secretary to develop a potentially preventable readmission measure for 
SNFs who must begin publicly reporting on the measure in October 2017. 
Home health agencies were required by the Deficit Reduction Act of 
2005 to submit data from the Outcome and Assessment Information Set 
(OASIS) to the Secretary, which would allow for the assessment of quality 
of care. A 2012 report by the HHS Office of the Inspector General critical 
of CMS’s oversight of HHAs’ compliance with reporting requirements 
led to the development of a new pay-for-reporting program. Beginning 
July 2015, HHAs that fail to meet a reporting threshold will see a 2 
percent reduction in their market basket updates.88 
Some PAC providers’ future payments will also be adjusted based on 
their actual performance on various measures. The ACA required CMS 
to develop a plan to pay SNFs and HHAs for the quality of care they 
provide to Medicare beneficiaries. PAMA requires the Secretary to 
implement a value-based purchasing program by 2019 that would adjust 
a SNF’s payments on the basis of its readmission rate.89 This proposal is 
based on MedPAC research showing that 15 percent of Medicare patients 
discharged from a hospital to a SNF experience potentially avoidable 
readmissions to the hospital, either during their SNF stay or within 30 
days after discharge.90 
Measuring quality in PAC settings is difficult for a number of reasons 
including lack of data on outcomes of care. It is also difficult because 
some patients receiving post-acute care will not regain function or 
recuperate from their illness. For this reason, adequate risk adjustment 
is key to making fair comparisons across providers and for avoiding 
penalizing providers who treat patients unlikely to recover from their 
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condition. Creating financial incentives in the payment systems to 
improve quality of care may be especially difficult in a sector with such 
high Medicare margins. Providers can easily absorb small payment 
penalties or may not be motivated by rewards that are small in 
comparison to their profit margins. These dynamics may shift, however, 
if the size of penalties increases and as episode-based bundled payments 
for PAC services become more prevalent. 
LOOKING AHEAD
Although spending on post-acute care has slowed of late, that 
slowdown reflects broader health care spending trends and only 
minimally reflects refinement of Medicare PAC policies. Long-standing 
problems with Medicare’s payment systems for PAC providers persist: 
case mix systems poorly target payments and are easily manipulated, 
base rates set the level of payment too high, and data on risk-adjusted 
outcomes and appropriateness are lacking. For these reasons, MedPAC 
has frequently recommended the elimination of payment updates for 
PAC providers, urged CMS to rebase payments for some services, and 
called for moving toward a unified system that would peg payments 
to patient characteristics rather than sites of care. MedPAC has also 
recommended intermediate steps such as “aligned readmission policies 
[that] would hold PAC providers and hospitals jointly responsible for 
the care they furnish.”91 
Some have argued that adopting site-neutral payment, which MedPAC 
proposes for a limited number of conditions frequently treated in SNFs 
and IRFs, is simply a stop-gap measure until there is a more wholesale 
adoption of broader reforms such as bundled payment mandated by 
the ACA.92 The number of providers willing to go “at-risk” under the 
BPCI initiative has been limited, however, and few have taken on a full 
complement of episodes. Bundled payment models are still in their 
infancy and present conceptual and operational challenges that must be 
resolved before they can be fully adopted.93 Efforts to impose value-based 
purchasing rubrics on PAC providers are also at the very early stages of 
implementation. The current payment systems will continue to be the 
dominant payment models while broader reforms are being developed 
and tested. Refinements to the post-acute care PPSs recommended by 
MedPAC and others could be pursued to reduce spending growth, 
redistribute payments within payment systems to better target payments 
to costs, and ensure that the program is purchasing quality PAC services. 
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Such refinements could improve the post-acute care prospective payment 
systems and could strengthen the foundation on which to build broader 
payment reforms.
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